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In September 1993, just two months after ramming ratification of the Maastricht Treaty through the 
House of Commons, British prime minister John Major quipped that calls for economic and monetary 
union (EMU) in the EC had "all the quaintness of a rain dance and about the same potency."1 Indeed 
the political and economic problems confronting EMU seem legion. Ratification of the treaty provoked 
a prolonged political crisis within the Community, exposing divisions and opposition. Three crises 
within the European Monetary System in the space of two and a half years, seriously challenged the 
idea that the Community would be able to implement economic and monetary union. In the most 
serious of these, under severe speculative pressures, the EC countries agreed to widen the margins of 
fluctuation between their currencies from ±2.25% to ±15% in August 1993.2 Furthermore, the 
difficulties many states are finding in reaching the Maastricht Treaty's convergence criteria and the 
costs of switching from national currencies to the ecu present seemingly insuperable barriers. 
 
And yet, most EU member states publicly declare their determination to see the project through. Stage 
two of emu started January 1, 1994 on schedule with the establishment of the European Monetary 
Institute, the forerunner of the future European central 
 
 
 
Footnotes 
 
 
1 John Major, "Raise your eyes, there is a land beyond," The Economist, September 25, 1993. 
 
2 The Deutschemark and Dutch guilder remained within their ±2.25% bands. 
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bank. The EMI moved into its new headquarters in Frankfurt in November 1994 and, exercising its 
function of preparing for economic and monetary union, issued its first annual report in April 1995. As 
we approach the millennium, what developments are we likely to see. And what rough beast its hour 
come round at last, slouches towards Frankfurt to be born? 3 
 This paper argues the following. 
 
1. The crucial factor in determining whether EMU succeeds or fails is the solidity of the axis between 
France and Germany. More specifically Emu can be seen as a bargain made between the highest levels 
of executive power, the presidency in France and the chancellory in Germany. Creating Emu is 
therefore essentially a political, not an economic, project. The importance of other factors depends on 
the extent to which they might break this link. 
 
2. French and German interest in Emu stems from international structural constraints, imposed by the 
international financial system, the liberalization of EC capital markets and German unification. Emu 
can be seen as a joint strategy led by France and Germany to mitigate those constraints. The bargain 
between France and Germany that underlies Maastricht is extremely robust, not because the benefits of 
success are seen as so great, but because the costs of failure are seen as so high. 
 
3. Despite the rather detailed provisions of the Maastricht Treaty, implementing Emu involves an 
ongoing process of 
 
 
 
 
Footnotes 
 
 
3 Apologies to W.B. Yeats. 
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negotiation, primarily between France and Germany. Disputes between them can often be bitter and 
public, yet these ongoing battles over what Emu will look like take place within the context of a 
broader determination of both parties to bring it about. 
 
4. The major threat to implementing Emu comes not from international monetary turmoil, intra-EC 
politics, nor even the occasional public spats between French and German officials, but from domestic 
political opposition within France and/or Germany. Although the project has encountered significant 
domestic resistance, so far the French and German governments have successfully persevered and will 
likely continue to do so in the future. 
 
5. Despite the ratification crises, recurring EMS crises, and domestic difficulties, some type of Emu 
will likely be launched by 1999 or soon after, due to the strength of the French-German commitment to 
bring it about. 
 
The rest of the paper will 1) examine the nature and origins of the MaaStricht bargain on EMU, 2) 
show how France and Germany successfully navigated the treaty through its ratification crisis, 3) 
examine the effects the various EMS crises have had on the solidity of the Paris-Bonn axis, and 4) 
discuss domestic factors within France and Germany that might threaten the commitment of either 
government to uphold the Maastricht bargain. 
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The Maastricht bargain 
 
The Maastricht treaty can be seen as an effort by the highest levels of executive power in France and 
Germany to change the international structures in which they operate through collectively creating new international institutions. These two countries have long been the motor of European integration. Their 
status as the most powerful members of the Community and the fact that both are willing and able to 
proceed with this project on their own has limited the options available to other member states. In turn, 
the apex of the executive branch in both countries has used its pivotal position to outmaneuver 
domestic opposition from societal actors and even other state actors to achieve their objectives. 
 
Three interrelated factors help explain the Maastricht bargain between France and Germany -- the 
evolution of the international monetary and financial system, the dynamic generated by the single 
market and concerns ushered in with German unification. By far, the most important of these is the 
first. The floating exchange rates, huge international financial markets and high mobility of capital 
which characterize the contemporary international financial system have progressively stripped from 
European states the ability to pursue independent national monetary policies. States find themselves in 
a global competition for capital that reduces their ability to set monetary policy according to domestic 
policy goals. 4 
 
 
 
Footnotes 
 
 
 
4 See Philip G. Cerny, The Changing Architecture of Politics: Structure, Agency and the Future of the 
State, (London: Sage, 1990), pp. 212-222; and John B. Goodman, Monetary Sovereignty, (Ithaca N-Y: 
Cornell University Press, 1992), p. 183. 
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The breakdown of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates in 1973 fed a process of 
geometric expansion in international financial markets, facilitated by advances in information and 
telecommunications technology. As a result, central bank reserves have declined as a percentage of the 
global daily turnover on foreign exchange markets, reducing their ability to stabilize exchange rates 
through market intervention. 5 
 
Compounding this vulnerability was the fact that under floating exchange rates, the international 
monetary system tended to revolve around a dollar-deutschemark axis. During periods of dollar 
weakness, funds tend to go out of dollars and into deutschemarks. 6 This puts upward pressure on the 
mark in relation to other European currencies, especially the franc, regardless of whether domestic 
economic policies within the EC are divergent or not. Exchange rate instability hit France harder than 
Germany, 
 
 
 
Footnotes 
 
 
5 Global turnover on foreign exchange markets was estimated at $1 trillion a day in 1992, a 300% 
increase from just 1986. The New York market alone went from a daily turnover of $10 billion in 1977 
to $192 billion in 1992. A recent IMF report suggests that this expansion of global financial integration 
is still in its "adolescence" Morris Goldstein, David Folkerrs-Landau, Peter Garber, Liliana Rojas-
Suarez and Michael Spencer. " International Capital Markets: Part I. Exchange Rate Management and 
International Capital Flows," World Economic and Financial Surveys (Washington, DC: International 
Monetary Fund, April 1993). 
 6 The deutschemark is a preferred substitute for the dollar largely because of West Germany's 
perceived political stability, its liberal policy on foreign investment, the liquidity of markets for the 
Deutschemark and the Bundesbank's commitment to maintaining its value. For a good explanation of 
this phenomenon, see Elke Thiel, "Deutschmark Between the Dollar and the EMS," Aussenpolitik, 
English edition, Vol. 33, No. 1, 1982. Also see Jacques van Ypersele, The European Monetary System: 
Oriqins, operation and outlook (Chicago: St. James Press, 1985), p. 99. 
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confronting it with a vicious cycle of currency depreciation and price inflation. Nevertheless unbridled 
deutschemark appreciation posed a threat to Germany's exports--the engine of its post-war economic 
growth. Furthermore, German leaders found that under floating exchange rates raising interest rates to 
stem inflation often had the perverse effect of undermining anti-inflationary policies by attracting large 
amounts of foreign capital that would swell Germany's money supply. It was in response to these 
vulnerabilities that France and Germany launched a joint initiative that culminated in the creation of 
the European Monetary System (EMS) in 1979. 7 
 
The EC's single market project created new pressures for European monetary integration. The project 
itself was in part a reaction to the constraints the international financial system imposed on Europe. 
The idea was born out of frustration over "Eurosclerosis" -- the continent's seeming inability to recover 
from the economic turbulence of the 1970s and its persistent decline vis-a-vis the United States and 
Japan." It resulted from 
 
 
 
Footnotes 
 
 
7 Many analysts argue that Germany has no real economic interest in Emu. However, Germany has 
demonstrated an interest in exchange rate stability in the past with respect to the EMS. The EMS itself 
only came about when German chancellor Helmut Schmidt saw a need for it to counter a dollar crisis 
and resist international pressures to reflate the German economy. Even the Bundesbank, which was 
initially skeptical of the EMS has taken important actions to strengthen and preserve it, such as the 
Basle-Nyborg accords in October 1987 and the coordinated interest rate adjustment with the Bank of 
France in November 1987, in response to the New York stock market crash of the previous month. 
 
8 In the fifteen years after 1973, industrial production had risen by 60% in Japan, 40% in the US but 
only 20% in Europe. While employment had increased by 15 million in the US between 1973 and 1983, 
it had decreased by 3 million in the Community during the same period. For discussions of 
"Eurosclerosis" or "Europessimism" see Wayne Sandholtz and John Zysman. "1992: Recasting the 
European Bargain," World Politics, October 1989, pp. 108-111; Michel Albert and James Ball, Toward 
European Economic Recovery in the 1980s: Report to the European Parliament, The Washington 
Papers, No. 109 (New York: Praeger, 1984); Jean-Pierre Moussy, "Le Grand Marché Intérieur 
Européen a l'horizon 1992," Regards sur l'Actualité, February 1988; and "1992: A Survey of Europe' s 
Internal Market," the Economist, July 9, 1988. 
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a French diplomatic initiative, after the dramatic failure of France' s Socialist experiment in economic 
policy, itself due largely to these international financial constraints. Its goal was to reverse Europe's 
economic decline by creating a "Europe without frontiers" that would remove all remaining regulatory 
obstacles to the free movement of goods, people, services and capital within the EC.  
It was foreseen that the single market project would also unleash new structural dynamics that would 
force the pace of monetary integration. The creation of a single European market in finance would spur 
economic growth by simultaneously increasing the amount and decreasing the cost of capital within 
the EC. However, the abolition of exchange controls this required would increase the potential 
volatility of intra-EC capital flows and further expose EC currencies to the pressures of the 
international financial system. Failure to reform European monetary arrangements to meet these 
dangers could force a reversal of financial integration via the reimposition of exchange controls, a re-
fragmenting of Europe's financial markets that would effectively destroy the EC's 1992 
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single market project.' 
 
Recognizing this relationship, French finance minister, Edouard Balladur proposed the creation of a 
European central bank in January 1988. Balladur's proposal was soon supported by Germany's foreign 
minister, Hans Dietrich Genscher, its chancellor, Helmut Kohl and even by Bundesbank president, 
Karl Otto Pöhl. The EC's Hannover Summit in June 1988 agreed to appoint an expert committee, 
which would produce the Delors report in April 1989, delineating a three stage process for creating a 
European central bank and a single European currency. 
 
German unification raised the stakes and accelerated the process of European monetary integration. It 
radically 
 
 
 
Footnotes 
 
 
9 See Christian Goux, "La Liberation des Mouvements de Capitaux en Europe et la Question d'une 
monnaie européenne," Après-demain, February 1988, p. 25. In an expert study authorized by the 
European Commission, Tomasso Padoa-Schioppa has argued that free trade in goods and services, 
capital liberalization, fixed exchange rates and national control of monetary policy forman 
"inconsistent quartet" that could only be resolved by establishing a Community-wide monetary policy. 
See David Cameron, "The 1992 Initiative: Causes and Consequences," in Europolitics ed. by Alberta 
M. Sbragia, (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1992), pp. 2627; and Wayne Sandholtz, 
"Choosing Union: monetary politics and Maastricht, " International Organiztion, Winter 1993, p. 20. 
However, Sandholtz contends that: "The economic logic (of monetary union) is not compelling. A 
fully liberalized EC market could operate effectively with existing national currencies. Indeed, market 
forces (currency competition) would provide a powerful incentive for national governments to 
maintain low inflation." p. 21. However, as recent experience has shown, factors beside inflation rates 
may determine the relative strength of currencies. Trying to follow German interest rates might mean 
EC members have to squeeze their domestic economies harder than required to control inflation. 
Market forces are just as likely (if not more so) to lead to currency instability or the reintroduction of 
exchange controls as to higher interest rates, both of which undermine the single market project. In 
short, the economic connection between financial integration and monetary integration may indeed be 
compelling. 
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superimposed high politics on the already compelling economic reasons for European monetary 
integration. In this new  
environment, France's leaders feared that its own independence could only encourage German 
independence, which in turn would inevitably mean French marginalization.10 For their part, German 
leaders stressed repeatedly that German unification and European integration were two sides of the 
same coin.11 Chancellor Helmut Kohl argued again and again that Germanymust increase its 
economic and political cooperation with the rest of Europe or face a return to the past of national and 
power political rivalries--a past which had been neither kind nor secure for Germany. It was in this 
context that the Maastricht Treaty was negotiated. 
 
The Ratification crisis 
 
On June 2, 1992, Denmark's narrow rejection of the Maastricht treaty in a binding 
referendumprovoked a prolonged crisis over the treaty's ratification. This crisis demonstrated the 
centrality of 
 
 
 
Footnotes 
 
 
10 See Stephen Philip Kramer, "The French Question," The Washinqton Ouarterly, Autumn 1991, 
especially pp. 83 and 86; and Stanley Hoffmann, "French Dilemmas and Strategies in the New 
Europe," in After the Cold War, ed. by Robert O. Keohane, Joseph S. Nye and Stanley Hoffmann, pp. 
128-132. 
 
11 See for instance Helmut Kohl's comments on French television during the French debate on 
Maastricht ratification: "We wanted to say that Germanunity and European unification are two sides of 
the same coin, it is the crowning of franco-german friendship, it is the crowning of a historic process, 
that is why the day, the week or the month which consecrated German unity in 1989 and which came 
to its conclusion in 1990, cleared the way for the Maastricht Treaty and its ratification." French text of 
Kohl's remarks, translated from La Politique Etrangere de la France; Textes et Documents, September 
1992, p. 14. 
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the Paris-Bonn axis to the fortunes of Emu and strength of their determination to bring it about. 
Technically, Denmark's rejection should have killed the treaty outright, but the French and German 
governments were unwilling to let Maastricht die. On June 3, the day after the Danish referendum, 
Kohl and Mitterrand issued a joint declaration reaffirming their determination to pursue 
implementation of the European Union called for in the Maastricht Treaty. French leaders stated 
publicly the same day that Maastricht could be implemented without Denmark by the remaining eleven 
members of the Community.12 German leaders for their part agreed. As one senior German diplomat 
remarked: "We would.make a new treaty without Denmark. We are not going to let 24,000 peculiar 
people stop Europe's momentum. Legal solutions can always be found."13 
 
EC foreign ministers endorsed the French-German line at an emergency meeting in Oslo. It was 
decided that the Maastricht treaty would not be renegotiated or modified. The eleven members of the 
Community would proceed with ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, leaving the door open for 
Denmark to reconsider its decision at a later date. 
However, the British government's decision to suspend further 
 
 
 
Footnotes  
 
12 See Mitterrand's declaration to the (French) Council of Ministers and Dumas's interviews with RTL 
and TF1 in La Politique Etrangère de la France. Textes et Documents, June 1992, pp. 101103. For the 
French version of the joint declaration by Mitterrand and Kohl, see La Politique Etrangère de la France. 
Textes et Documents, June 1992, p. 101. 
 
13 Quoted in Economist, June 6, 1992, p. 51. 
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consideration of the Maastricht Treaty until after the resolution of the crisis created by the Danish vote 
complicated the ratification crisis. In its role as rotating president of the EC during the second half of 
1992, Britain had primary responsibility for negotiating a solution to the Danish crisis. There were 
French and German doubts as to Britain's willingness to defend a treaty it had never sought and did not 
particularly like. Furthermore, a small group of die-hard treaty opponents within the Conservative 
party, exploited the government's thin majority after the April 1992 elections and stymied Major's 
efforts to bring forward ratification of the treaty in the House of Commons in November 1992. 
 
To influence Britain's behavior,' France and Germany made it clear that they would not let problems 
associated with ratifying the treaty stop them from carrying out its objectives. Mitterrand suggested 
publicly that if no solution could be found to the problems of Danish and British ratification, the other 
ten could proceed towards European Union on their own.14 While Kohl was less direct, he made it 
clear nonetheless that Germany wanted all the member states to ratify the treaty unchanged. Major 
clearly understood the dangers that Britain might be isolated from deciding the Community's future 
course.15 
 
 
 
Footnotes 
 
 
14 Financial Times, December 11, 1992, p. 1. 
 
15 In debate in the House of Commons, Major declared: "The essential question is simply: are we or 
are we not in this country to play a central role in Europe's development." Financial Times, November 
5, 1992, p. 18. 
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At the Edinburgh EC summit of December 11-12, 1992, Major skillfully brokered a resolution to the 
Danish crisis. All twelve member states signed a decision, legally binding in international law, that 
clarified rather than amended the treaty. The decision stated that European citizenship did not replace 
national citizenship, that Denmark would continue its membership in the European Monetary System, 
but not participate in the European System of Central Banks or the single currency (in doing so, 
Denmark was exercising in advance a right already granted to it in a protocol to the Maastricht Treaty), 
and 'that Denmark was not obliged to join the Western European Union and would not participate in 
decisions with defence implications. Denmark would be allowed to abandon this decision and 
participate fully in the European Union at any time it chose.16 The decision at Edinburgh allayed the 
concerns of many Danish voters who approved the treaty by a decisive margin in a second referendum 
on May 18, 1993. 
 After the second Danish referendum, the British government resumed its own efforts to ratify the treaty. 
However, on July 22, it faced a humiliating defeat on a motion to ratify the treaty by an unholy alliance 
between Labour and Tory Eurorebels who voted against their party.17 Pushed to the wall by 
opposition within his 
 
 
 
Footnotes 
 
 
16 For the text of the decision, see Bulletin of the European Communities, 12-1992, pp. 25-26. To 
satisfy German concerns that the decision not be seen as a renegotiation of the Treaty, which might 
permit legal challenges in the national courts, the decision was divided into sections rather than articles. 
Economist, December 19, 1992, p. 48. 
 
17 Financial Times, July 23, 1993, p. 7. 
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own party, Major then set down a motion of confidence giving the government the authority to ratify 
the Maastricht Treaty. Major made it clear that if the government lost this vote, he would ask the 
Queen for a dissolution of parliament forcing an early general election. This put the Tory rebels over a 
barrel. With the Conservatives running third in the polls at that time, behind both Labour and the 
Liberal Democrats, the rebels faced the prospect of pushing their party to a disastrous electoral defeat 
and losing their own seats. Faced with this pressure, the Tory rebels finally came into line and on July 
23, the House of Commons approved the motion of confidence, 339 to 299. After failed constitutional 
challenges in Britain and Germany, the Maastricht treaty finally came into effect on November 1, 1993. 
Since September 1992, the European Monetary System has suffered three major crises. These crises 
have resulted in bitter and public recriminations between member states, even between France and 
Germany. Skeptics point to these recurring crises within the EMS to argue that implementing Emu 
simply isn't feasible. However, these crises have had the rather curious effect of cementing the political 
will of France and Germany to bring it about. Turmoil within the EMS has strengthened Germany's 
hand in the ongoing process of negotiating the details of Emu, making it more likely that it will get the 
kind of Emu it wants. For the French, these recurrent crises highlight their continued vulnerability 
without Emu. 
 
The September 1992 EMS crisis arose from the financial 
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problems associated with German unification. The massive costs of this project were funded largely by 
government borrowing, rather than higher taxes or reduced public spending. To counteract the 
inflationarypressures this generated, in July 1992 the Bundesbank raised German interest rates to 
8.75%, their highest level since 1931. Coming so close after the Danish referendum, which narrowly 
rejected the Maastricht Treaty, this decision increased doubts on the part of international investors 
about the viability of the EMS. Bitter rows between Germany and its EC partners over interest rates, 
particularly with Britain at the Bath meeting of economics and finance ministers on September 5th, 
merely reinforced this trend. 
 
Things came to a head on September 16, when the EMS suffered the worst crisis in its history up to 
that point. Great Britain and Italy suspended their participation in the exchange rate mechanism of the 
EMS, while Spain devalued the peseta by 5%.18 The French managed to maintain the franc's value, 
but only by increasing their own interest rates and by engaging in massive intervention on foreign 
exchange markets in conjunction with Germany.  
The EMS crisis of September 1992 was ominous. The fact that 
 
 
 
Footnotes 
 
 
18 Spain devalued by another 6% in November along with Portugal. Portugal, Spain, and Ireland all 
temporarily reimposed exchange controls to protect their currencies. These three countries and 
Denmark also raised short-term interest rates intermittently during November to ward off speculators. 
Finland, Sweden and Norway who had tied their currencies to the ECU to bolster their applications for 
membership in the EC were forced to float in September, November and December respectively. 
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there had been no realignment within the EMS in nearly six years had given credibility to the 
Community's ambitions of creating a single market and economic and monetary union. The 
reimposition of exchange controls by Spain, Portugal and Ireland was a step backward from the single 
market goal of financial integration. After September 1992, not merely the stability of the EMS, but 
the Maastricht Treaty and even the single market were cast .in doubt. However, the core exchange rate 
in the EMS, the franc-mark parity remained in tact and the crisis did not derail the coordinated French-
German efforts to pressure Britain and Denmark to ratify Maastricht without amendment. 
 
However, the crisis that hit the EMS in August 1993 was even worse. This was primarily a crisis 
surrounding the French franc. The new right-wing government that came to power in March 1993, 
engaged in an aggressive policy of lowering French interest rates to stimulate growth, cutting the Bank 
of France's intervention rate nine times, from 9.1% to 6.75%, in the space of 3 months. Based on the 
fact, that the French economy had been outperforming Germany on inflation since July 1991, the new 
government probably believed that there was room to make significant interest rate reductions without 
threatening the value of the franc. Indeed, at the end of June, a senior Bank of France official 
suggested that France could share the anchor role within the EMS with Germany.19 At about the same 
time, France's new finance minister, Edmond Alphandéry, 
 
 
 
Footnotes 
 
 
19 Financial Times, June 23, 1993, p. 16.  
 
Original Page 15 
 
suggested that based on the soundness of its economy France was ready to take the lead in setting 
European interest rates and began pressing Germany to cooperate in "concerted" interest rate 
reductions.z° 
 
These efforts backfired. International markets interpreted these moves as a signal that with 
unemployment above 12% and a presidential election less than two years away, France was ready to 
make a dash for growth and willing to abandon its franc fort policy if necessary to achieve it. 
Concerted French-German exchange rate intervention could not dampen the rush from the franc. Under 
severe speculative pressures, the EC countries agreed on August 2, 1993 to widen the margins of 
fluctuation between their currencies from ±2.25% to ±15%.21 
With a permissible variation of 30% between individual currencies, it is not surprising that many 
observes declared the EMS, and any subsequent attempts at Emu, dead. Nevertheless, developments after the crisis testify to the continued determination of France and Germany to carry on. Immediately 
after the crisis, France and Germany joined by most other member states insisted that it would not 
derail plans for Emu.22 In November 1993, the Franco-German economic & financial council meeting 
in Berlin announced a joint convergence plan, indicating both 
 
 
 
Footnotes 
 
 
20 See Financial Times, July 14, 1993, p. 2; and July 1, 1993, p. 2. 
 
21 The Deutschemark and Dutch guilder remained within their ±2.25% bands. 
 
22 Financial Times, August 3, 1993, p. 1. 
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countries plans to meet the Maastricht treaty' s convergence criteria by 1996. 23 In December 1993, in 
accordance with the treaty the Bank of France was given its independence. Stage two of Emu, the 
creation of the European Monetary Institute, forerunner of the European Central Bank, began on 
schedule on January 1, 1994. 
 
Rather than take advantage of the wider margins to lower interest rates, France and most other EMS 
members chose to shadow their old pre-crisis parities. Paradoxically, the new wider margins made this 
easier to do by depriving speculators of a one way bet against EC currencies in trouble. By late 1994, 
France, Germany and their EU partners began to look seriously at the technical problems to be 
overcome to bring a single European currency into being. French officials stressed the importance of 
meeting the Maastricht treaty's timetable for the start of stage three of Emu, while German leaders 
argued that from their perspective the treaty's convergence criteria was more important than the 
timetable. However, both sides reaffirmed their commitment to bring Emu about. 
 
Spill-over effects from the Mexican peso crisis and mismanaged US attempts to provide a rescue 
package for Mexico created an international financial crisis that led to another EMS crisis in March 
1995. The Mexican crisis highlighted the risks in emerging markets, sparking a global flight to quality. 
Funds flowed into the deutschemark pushing up its value against other EMS currencies. On March 6, 
the Spanish peseta was devalued by 7%, its fourth 
 
 
 
Footnotes 
 
 
23 Financial Times, November 3, 1993, p. 16. 
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devaluation in two and a half years. The Portuguese escudo was devalued by 3.5% the same day. The 
franc hit an all-time low against the mark during the March crisis and the Bank of France lifted its 3 
month money market rate from 5.4% to 8.3% during the first week of March to protect the franc's 
value. 
 While another crisis in the EMS was certainly unwelcome, the March crisis was not as serious as the 
one suffered in August 1993. While the franc lost its value, it was clear that it would not hit its floor 
against the deutschemark. Again, as in previous crises, France and Germany reaffirmed their 
determination to implement Emu. The regular meeting of the Franco-German economic and financial 
council on March 21, declared that both countries would be able to enter stage three of Emu on time, 
that German already met the treaty's convergence criteria, while France still needed to work on 
reducing its budget deficits.24 
 
Domestic obstacles in France and Germany 
 
The process of ratifying the Maastricht treaty, stimulated domestic opposition to the goal of Emu in 
France and Germany. So far the French and German governments have managed to successfully 
navigate around these problems. However, to the extent that these domestic factors can force either the 
French of German government to abandon its commitment to implement Emu, they can threaten the 
proj ect' s future. 
 
The highly centralized nature of the French political system 
 
 
 
Footnotes 
 
 
24 Financial Times, March 22, 1995, p. 14.  
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has given the government a great deal of leeway in formulating French policy. However, it would be a 
mistake to overestimate the state' s autonomy in France. A long history of political instability has made 
French leaders keenly aware of the fragility of their institutions. Several writers have noted the 
ambivalent French attitude toward authority, seeing central control both as source of and potential 
solution for their grievances. Extra-legal protests can challenge the legitimacy of the state by 
disrupting its capacity to maintain order. 25 
 
On June 3, 1992, the day after the Danish referendum, French President Francois Mitterrand 
announced that France would hold its own referendum to ratify the Maastricht Treaty. In calling this 
referendum, Mitterrand sought to emphasize French commitment to Maastricht in the wake of the 
crisis created by the Danish referendum. Instead, he managed to conjure up a disparate lot of anti-
Maastricht forces consisting of the Communists on the left, the National Front on the extreme right, 
most members of the neo-Gaullist RPR, many centrists from the UDF and a handful of Socialists. In 
reality, there was not a single campaign against Maastricht, but a diverse collection of campaigns each 
with its own separate agenda. 
Startled into action by the unexpected gains of the anti-Maastricht forces, the pro-Maastricht campaign 
began in earnest 
 
 
 
Footnotes 
 
 
25 0n these points, see Stanley Hoffmann, "The Ruled: Protest as a National Way of Life", Decline or 
Renewal, (New York: Viking Press, 1974); and Michel Crozier, The Bureaucratic Phenomenon. 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1964). 
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towards the end of August. The Yes campaign focused less on the positive benefits of the Treaty itself 
and much more on the negative consequences of French rejection. The issue was framed as one of 
international constraint rather than domestic choice. French leaders argued that without Maastricht the 
single market would fail, and any chance of restricting German dominance over Europe' s economic 
policy through the Bundesbank and the deutschemark would disappear. Failure to ratify would mean a 
weakening of French-German ties both politically and economically, leaving France weaker and 
unable to constrain Germany from steering an independent course. 26 
 
The No campaign was undercut by the fact that the leadership of the major opposition parties, the RPR 
and the UDF supported the Treaty. As it turned out, French voters narrowly ratified the Maastricht 
Treaty on September 20, by a vote of 51% to 49%. 
However, this was not the end of the matter. While the French economy posted a strong recovery in 
1994, this failed to make an appreciable dent in the country's unemployment which stood at over 3 
million workers and more than 12% in the workforce. Furthermore, French workers who had been 
forced to accept wage restraint for 
 
 
 
Footnotes 
 
 
26 See comments by foreign ministers Roland Dumas in an article appearing in Le Figaro, September 
3, 1992, reprinted in L__a Politique Etrangère he la France. Textes et Documents, September 1992, p. 
36; comments by Michel Sapin, the finance minister in Le Monde, September 2, 1992, p. 8; and 
comments by Prime Minister, Pierre Bérégovoy in Le Monde, September 8, 1992, p. 11. Also see 
Francois Mitterrand's comments during his televised debate with Philippe Séguin at the Sorbonne on 
September 3, 1992 in La Politique Etrangère de la France. Textes et Documents, September 1992. 
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several years became impatient for more of the fruits of their labor. By the spring of 1995 unions in 
several sectors began threatening to go on strike. 
 
At the same time, French voters were becoming more disaffected from the country's main political 
parties. Corruption scandals, the lack of divergence on major issues and their seeming inability to solve 
the country's problems encouraged the French to vote against the established parties in greater numbers. 
The trend started with the National Assembly elections of 1993 and continued on until the first round 
of the presidential election in April 1995, which had the lowest turnout and the highest protest voter 
ever in a presidential election during the Fifth Republic. 27 
 
The election of Jacques Chirac as France's new president on May 7, 1995, poses some interesting 
questions about the direction of French policy in the future. His attitude towards Emu has wavered. In 
March 1995, he took back the call he had made the previous November for a national referendum 
before France adopted the single European currency. During the campaign he insisted that he was a 
firm supporter of Emu and reminded voters that he had supported ratification of the Maastricht Treaty 
(although it should be noted he hesitated over a month before doing so). He sent conflicting signals in 
April, when he criticized the governor of the Bank of France, saying he had no right to dictate French 
 
 
 
Footnotes 
 
 27 Turnout for the first round of the 1995 presidential election was 78.4% turnout. Only 62% voted for 
the established parties (the Socialists, the neo-Gaullist RPR and the centrist UDF). 31% of the 
unemployed vote went to the National Front candidate, Jean Marie Le Pen. Financial Times, April 25, 
1995, p. 19. 
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economic policy, but responded to accusations that he was undermining the franc's stability by 
declaring himself a firm supporter of the franc fort policy.28 
 
Now that Chirac is president, which way is he likely to turn? Some indication was given in his victory 
speech when he declared that all government action would be judged in terms of whether or not it 
helped to reduce unemployment.29 Chirac seems to believe that he can have his cake and eat it too--
that stimulating employment will help, not hinder, French efforts to reduce budget deficits to meet the 
Maastricht criteria. He may instead find himself caught between the Scylla of another speculative 
attack against the franc and the Charibdis of a social explosion at home. Nevertheless, even in the 
event of a debacle on economic policy, an event much less likely now than it was in 1983, as long as 
France itself does not repudiate the goal of Emu, there is a good chance that the project can still be 
completed, although at a later date than the French hope. France still has compelling interests in Emu 
and they are not likely to go away. 
 
The German government has had a more difficult time dealing with domestic opposition to Emu than 
the French. This was so for a number of reasons. First, Germany, unlike all the other EC states with the 
possible exception of France, could exercise effective veto power over the whole Maastricht project. 
Second, 
 
 
 
Footnotes 
 
 
28 Financial Times, April 20, 1995, p. 16.  
29 Financial Times, May 9, 1995, p. 2. 
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although Maastricht was certainly important to Germany for both economic and political reasons, of all 
EC states it would probably be least effected by its failure. Therefore, the external constraints on 
German decisions were arguably less than those facing any other EC member state. And third, the 
decentralized nature of the German political system divided state power among state actors and 
provided societal actors numerous points of institutional access to decision-making. 
 
The staggering costs of German unification made many Germans fearful that European unification 
would impose even greater sacrifices. The massive transfers of wealth from west to east, soaring 
unemployment in the east due to economic restructuring and ballooning government deficits to finance 
this operation all supported those who argued that Germany needed to maintain a free hand in 
monetary policy. While all the major political parties support Maastricht, opinion polls regularly show 
more Germans dislike the idea of economic and monetary union than like it. For many Germans, the 
deutschemark is a potent symbol of Germany's success and stability in the post-war period and they are 
anxious about the prospect of letting it go.30 
 
 
 
Footnotes  
 
30 See Financial Times, August 17, 1992, p. 10; and October 26, 1992, Section III, p. 1. This 
sentiment is well expressed by Wolfram Hanrieder: "The German D-Mark became the symbol of 
German probity, industriousness, economic success, and ultimately political responsibility. There 
developed among the Germans a deep conviction that the equilibrium of money was a precondition for 
the equilibrium of society, and that price stability ("neutral" money) meant equitable economics and 
therefore fair politics." Wolfram F. Hanrieder, Germany, America, Europe: Forty Years of German 
Foreign Policy. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989), p. 228. 
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The Maastricht Treaty required changes to Germany's constitution, the Basic Law, which could only 
come about through a two-thirds majority in both houses of the German Parliament. This allowed the 
opposition Social Democratic Party to play a role in the ratification process. The Social Democrats 
agreed to ratify the Treaty, but only after insisting that the Bundestag would have to approve 
Germany's entry into the third stage of Emu. 31 
Germany's independent central bank, the Bundesbank, also complicated the government's policy 
towards ratification. Its single minded pursuit of anti-inflationary policies über älles had played a large 
role in the September 1992 and August 1993 EMS crises. Additionally, Bundesbank officials would 
periodically go out of their way, not only to criticize economic and monetary union, but aspects of 
political union as well. On taking office as Bundesbank president in October 1993, Hans Tiermeyer 
declared that his institution's central task was defending the stability of the deutschemark and that it 
had no scope to act as the central bank for all of Europe.32 At various times, he criticized countries, 
including Germany, for falling short of convergence criteria, argued the convergence criteria really 
were not strict enough and called for greater political integration in Europe to accompany Emu. 
 
 
 
Footnotes 
 
 
31 German text of the new Article 23 can be found in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, December 3, 
1992. Also see Das Parlament, December 12, 1992, p. 1; Financial Times, December 2, 1992, p. 16; 
and Keesing's Record of World Events, December 1992, p. 39244. 
 
32 Financial Times, October 2, 1993, p. 1. 
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Nevertheless the German government remains committed to carrying out the objective of Emu. In 
September 1994, the parliamentary caucus of Germany's ruling Christian Democratic party published a 
document in preparation for the 1996 intergovernmental conference. The CDU. paper affirmed the 
goal of Emu and called for even closer coordination among a "hard core" of five countries--Germany, 
France and the Benelux countries--in the areas of fiscal, budgetary, economic & social policy. 33 
Although Kohl declared the paper was not official government policy, it was framed by Wolfgang 
Schäuble, the leader of the CDU parliamentary group, and the man widely tipped as Helmut Kohl's 
eventual successor, and Karl Lamers, the CDU parliamentary group's foreign policy spokesman. 
 
Comments made by Lamers and Schäuble after the paper was published while not necessarily official 
government policy, are undoubtedly good indications of Helmut Kohls' thinking. In a commentary in 
the Financial Times in November 1994, Lamers declared: The D-mark occupies what some feel to be a dominant position in Europe. As a result, the existing 
European Monetary System, which is in essence a German one, cannot be a permanent solution for 
Europe's monetary arrangements. In the long run, it is unacceptable for other member states to have to 
acquiesce in monetary decisions made by the Bundesbank.TM 
 
Wolfgang Schäuble, for his part, also indicated strong German support for Emu: "The soul of Germany 
is Europe, it is not the D- 
 
 
 
Footnotes 
 
 
33 Financial Times, September 2, 1994, p. 2. 
 
34 Karl Lamers, "Compelling case for monetary union," Financial Times, November 7, 1994, p. 16. 
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mark."35 Schäble also indicated that although Germany would certainly like to see greater progress in 
political integration, it would not make progress on Emu conditional on it: "We have ratified the treaty, 
and monetaryunion will be carried out so long as the conditions [on economic convergence] are 
fulfilled. 
 
I believe in implementing treaties that we have signed and ratified.." 36 
 
Conclusion 
 
Despite the hard knocks of the ratification crisis, recurring EMS crises, and domestic difficulties, Emu 
is likely to be implemented, due to the determination of the French and German governments to bring 
it about. This determination rests on a shared belief that due to external constraints from the 
international financial system, the single market project and German unification, both countries are 
much better off with Emu than without it. These constraints, severe as they are now, are likely to 
increase over time. 
 
Nevertheless, the Emu that first emerges may not look the way many might have expected when the 
Maastricht treaty was first signed. Stage three will likely start by the 1999 deadline, or very soon after. 
It will probably start with the creation of the European Central Bank that will include a small inner 
core including France and Germany and two concentric circles. Over 
 
 
 
Footnotes 
 
 
35 Financial Times, March 21, 1995, p. 14. 
 
36 Financial Times, March 21, 1995, p. 14. 
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time, it will be expanded to bring more of the countries in these outer circles inside. It will likely start 
without the single European currency, but this 'will probably be introduced within the first five years after the start of stage three. Emu will start with a strong bias towards anti-inflationary-policies, but 
these will be for the Emu countries as a whole, not just Germany. This should be a great benefit for the 
non-German Emu members, particularly France, which will be able to enjoy low inflation with lower 
interest rates than at present. There will be an ongoing struggle between ECOFIN's ability to set 
economic policy for the EU . as a whole and the ECB' s independence and commitment to low 
inflation. However, this would likely be little different from the experience of those countries that 
already have independent central banks. 
 
The most likely obstacles to the implementation of Emu would be internal developments in France and 
Germany. Domestic problems in other EU countries would be virtually irrelevant so long as France 
and German continue to demonstrate the will and the ability to go ahead by themselves if necessary. 
Since the leadership of the major governing and opposition parties in France and Germany recognize 
the importance of Emu, a full scale domestic revolt of some kind would probably be necessary to break 
their attachment to the project. Even then, government leaders will no doubt attempt to find ways of 
dealing with their domestic difficulties that do not undermine the likelihood of Emu. To the extent that 
French-German interest in Emu stems from structural factors, even 
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potential leaders opposed to the project may find their opinions change once they are faced with the 
responsibility of governing. 
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